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Coping With Capital Flow Volatility:
Policy Consideration for Nigeria
Mike I. Obadan, Ph.D, FNES, FIMC
I.

Introduction

O

ver the past three decades, there has been remarkable growth in
international
capital
flows,
especially
to
the
developing
countries/emerging market economies (EMEs). Such international
financial flows allow for the efficient allocation of savings and investment thereby
promoting growth. Indeed, in the recipient economies of capital flows, foreign
resources complement domestic savings in financing domestic investment and
also contribute to the development of domestic financial markets. Capital flows
provide additional financing to countries with limited domestic savings and make
local financial markets deeper and more liquid. As summarised by Obadan (2004:
84), “in the developing countries, where domestic resources tend to be in short
supply, capital inflows can lead to increased investment, fasten economic
growth, improved living standards, and the deepening and broadening of
domestic financial markets”. Despite these benefits, foreign capital flows have,
from time to time, elicited deep concerns and debates because of their
tendency to be volatile besides various macroeconomic and other related
effects. Huge surges in capital flows to the emerging market economies have
often been accompanied by crises as witnessed during the Mexican financial
crisis of 1994-1995, East Asian and Russian crises of 1997-1998, Turkey in 2000-2001,
and Argentina in 2001 - 2002.
Generally, the volatility of capital flows, especially in the form of huge surges pose
significant risks and raise concerns about excessive exchange rate appreciation
and the corresponding adverse impact on exports and growth. Besides, large
capital inflows may contribute to an unsustainable expansion of credit, generate
asset price bubbles and, consequently, increase financial fragility (Sidaoui,
Ramos-Francia and Cuadra, n.d). Concerns are also raised about the recipient
economies‟ vulnerability to sudden reversal in capital flows and the resulting
implications for financial and economic activities. Sudden reversals of capital
flows have an adverse impact on domestic economies as witnessed in the East
Asian financial crisis of 1997 – 1998 (Obadan, 2004: 207-240).



Mike Obadan is a Professor of Economics at the University of Benin and Chairman, Foundation for
Education and Development Benin City, Nigeria. The usual disclaimer applies.
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In light of the risks associated with foreign capital flows, it is desirable to have
appropriate policy responses to such flows, taking cognizance of the
determinants of capital flows volatility, the composition of capital flows and the
flows that are more susceptible to high volatility.

II.

Stylised Facts On Capital Flows Volatility

II.1

Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies

One major aspect of capital flows that attracts a high risk of volatility is the „hot
money‟ variety or temporary short-term flows that could be reversed at short
notice, and possibly lead to domestic financial crisis. “Temporary” capital flows
tend to be associated with the phenomenon of reversibility – the risk that capital
pulled in by certain temporary factors could flow out once the attractions
waned. Empirical evidence showed that capital flow reversals, known as „sudden
stops‟ in the literature, have an adverse impact on domestic economies through
contractions of domestic expenditure and production, collapses in real
exchange rate, and reductions in both asset prices and credit to the private
sector.


Capital flows to the emerging market economies (EMEs) have been more
volatile than those to the developed countries. In their study, Broner and
Rigobon (2004) found the percentage of greater volatility to be 80.0 per
cent. But this decreased when controlled for a series of macroeconomic
variables, and then non-fundamental variables such as outliers, lags, and
contagion effects. In the same way, the volatility of each component of
net capital flows is lower for the industrialised countries than for the
developing countries. While the volatility of each component of capital
has decreased for the developed countries, the volatility of net flows of
capital has increased for the developing countries (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozean
and Volosovych, 2004: 14).



Both the poor and middle-income developing countries experience a
high degree of volatility, particularly outflows. But while capital outflows
from the poor countries are more volatile than the outflows from the
middle-income countries, inflows are less volatile (very likely because the
poor countries receive little of the more volatile capital market flows)
(World Bank, 2002: 70). The implication is that many poor countries face
the same issues surrounding capital flows volatility and the consequences
for macroeconomic stabilisation as the middle-income countries. Overall,
the poor countries face higher levels of volatility. It is more costly for them,
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and they are less equipped to deal with it, compared with the middleincome countries.




The possible explanations for the greater volatility of capital flows to EMEs
are as follows:
o

Likelihood that EMEs are hit by fundamental shocks that have
different stochastic properties than those that affect the
developed countries and the capital flows might just reflect those
properties;

o

Different responses of capital flows to EMEs and developed
countries to similar fundamental shocks;

o

Tendency of EMEs to be subject to larger sources of nonfundamental shocks, such as crises, persistence, and contagion.

Generally, the factors that can cause capital flows volatility include:
macroeconomic variables, reflecting fundamental factors such as terms
of trade shocks, time preference shocks, and initial endowments. Others
are bad policies, weak institutions, underdevelopment of the domestic
financial markets, level of development, external factors, and nonfundamental factors such as crises, persistence, lags, and contagion. In a
study of a panel of 48 countries, Broto, et al., (2008) found that the
development of the domestic financial system tends to reduce the
volatility of portfolio and banking flows, while it is also relevant for the
other types of flows. Global factors were found to have become more
important in determining the volatility of capital flows, particularly in the
case of FDI flows. Also, FDI was found to be the flow whose volatility is
more associated with macroeconomic soundness. Higher per capita
GDP, the ratio of reserves to imports (a measure of self-insurance) and
lower inflation in the countries all reduce the volatility of FDI. Broner and
Rigobon (2004) similarly found underdevelopment of the domestic
financial markets, weak institutions and low per capita income as being
associated with capital flows volatility. In other words, financial
development, good institutions, and high income per capita are all
associated with lower volatility. Finally, bad policies, represented by
inflation, inflation volatility, government consumption – fiscal deficit, have
an important role in explaining the high volatility of different forms of
capital flows (Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozean, and Volosovych, 2004: 40). The
authors also found the level of development as an important variable in
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explaining the volatility of capital flows. Increases in GDP per capita
reduced the volatility of capital flows.


On the volatility of the components of capital flows, the literature
suggests a hierarchy of volatility and that long-term capital flows
(particularly foreign direct investment – FDI) are more stable than other
flows. FDI flows are in general less volatile than portfolio flows as they
normally tend to be driven by long-term considerations. An empirical
study by Turner (Griffith-Jones, 1998) concluded that a stability ranking
can be established in the following order:
o
o
o
o
o

II.2

Long-term bank loans;
Foreign direct investment;
Investment in bonds;
Investment in shares; and
Short-term credits

Volatility of Nigeria’s Capital Flows

Estimates of measures of volatility of components of Nigeria‟s capital flows
support the finding in the literature relating to the greater stability of FDI flows
(Table 1).
FDI inflows are far less volatile than portfolio investment inflows. The coefficient of
variation measure of volatility is much lower for total FDI inflow at 0.25, compared
with 0.69 for portfolio investment inflow. Also, while the coefficient of volatility of
net FDI flow is 0.23 that of net flow of portfolio investment is 3.99 and that of equity
securities is - 4.36. The volatility measures of FDI outflow are higher than those for
inflow. Other investment inflows relating to loans, and currency and deposits are
far more volatile than the other inflows.
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Table 1: Volatility of Components of Nigeria’s Foreign Capital Flows*
Capital Flows
Items

CV
of
Inflow+

CV
of
Outflow

CV of
Net
Flow

Mean
Inflow
($‟mn)

1. Foreign Direct
Investment
Equity Capital
Re-investment
Earnings
2.
Portfolio
investment
Equity Securities
Debt Securities
Long-term debt
securities
Short-term Debt
Securities
3.
Other
Investment
Loans
Currency
and
deposits

0.25

0.63

0.23

0.27
0.25

0.63
0.61

0.69
1.01
0.79
0.79

of

Mean of
Outflow
($‟mn)

Mean
of
Net Flow
($‟mn)

6,839.26

794.13

6,045.13

0.26
0.25

4,223.18
2,553.60

784.05
11.72

3,439.13
2,543.55

0.70

3.99

2,447.27

1,871.19

576.08

0.66
1.08

-4.36
0.85

1,185.57
1,261.69

1,669.74
201.47

-484.17
1,060.22

-0.56

-042

-4,320.35

9,922.65

-14,243.00

0.91
-2.04
-1.73
-3.18

-4,891.48
207.59

Notes: * Period covered is 2005 – 2011.
+ CV is Coefficient of Variation
Source: Underlying data are from CBN, Annual Report and Statistical Bulletin, Various Issues.

III.

Overview Of Policy Responses To Capital Flows

In light of the macroeconomic effects and concerns (including volatility) of
capital flows in relation to the potential benefits of higher investment and growth,
policy makers must find the right balance between accommodating the
beneficial effects of the inflows and the overheating/volatility effects. The policy
responses to capital flows depend not only on the macroeconomic effects and
concerns, but also on the need to achieve objectives such as:
o
o
o
o
o

Maintaining international competitiveness;
Avoiding over-reliance on short-term capital flows;
Encouraging more long-term capital flows;
Avoiding the risk of future debt or foreign exchange crisis; and
Complementing increased external savings with higher domestic
savings, thereby avoiding a displacement of domestic savings by
external savings.
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Besides, the policy responses to capital inflows fashioned out by the policy makers
depend on whether such inflows are likely to be sustained or temporary, and
whether the inflows carry the potential for improvements in investment and
growth. The appropriate policy responses are also a function of the nature and
causes of the inflows, degree of flexibility allowed by the domestic institutional
structure, persistence of the inflows, the nature of the domestic credit and
financial markets, as well as availability of different instruments and the extent of
credibility enjoyed by the authorities. Thus, for example, when surges in capital
inflow are clearly attracted by sustainable improvements in competitiveness or
potential productivity, the policy response could be focused on improving the
absorptive capacity of the economy than on containing the destabilizing effects.
This means that unless the inflows are caused by temporary changes in external
circumstances, domestic credit conditions, or bandwagon effects, the thrust of
the policy response should be on creating the conditions for the inflow to be used
productively. But where the effects of the inflows may be destabilising, policies
need to focus on how to contain the inflows or neutralise their effects.
Policy makers have at their disposal the following policy measures:
o Countercyclical macroeconomic policy measures – monetary
policy, fiscal policy and nominal exchange rate flexibility;
o

Structural measures (trade policy, banking and supervision and
regulation);

o

Foreign reserve accumulation; and

o

Macro-prudential policy.

Each of the policy tools has its benefits and costs which must be taken into
account when assessing the appropriate policy mix to deal with volatility of
capital flows.
Generally, where the capital flows are mainly driven by fundamental factors, the
corresponding real exchange rate (RER) appreciation and the consequent
change in relative prices could reflect the need to re-allocate resources in the
economy. The danger is the possibility of excessive expansion of domestic
demand that could lead to inflationary pressures in the non-tradable sector,
which in turn, would lead to a further appreciation of the RER. In this case, policy
actions should facilitate rather than impede the reallocation of resources from
tradable to non-tradable sectors. Policy makers should allow a nominal (and real)
appreciation caused by stable and long-term capital flows. However, measures
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could be adopted to mitigate the appreciation pressures if the magnitude of
capital inflows leads to a sharp appreciation of the RER. Here, the
macroeconomic policy stance would need to be adjusted.

III.1

Macroeconomic Policy: Fiscal Policy

Appreciation pressures relating to massive capital inflows can be handled with
fiscal consolidation. It could work to attenuate RER appreciation. As a significant
part of public expenditures involves non-tradable goods, fiscal consolidation
exerts downward pressure on the price of these goods. And the decline in the
relative price of non-tradable goods and services tends to depreciate the RER, or
ease appreciation pressures in the least.
A fiscal consolidation programme and a prudent monetary policy lead to
stronger macroeconomic fundamentals, which helps to improve investors‟
confidence and induce long-term and stable capital flows. However, the
additional sources of external funding associated with better fundamentals may
also lead to further appreciation pressures and may require additional fiscal
measures. Therefore, fiscal and monetary policies aimed at strengthening
macroeconomic fundamentals and improving investors‟ confidence should be
accompanied with structural reforms to take full advantage of the benefits
related to capital inflows. Over the medium-term, a tightening of fiscal policy
may be needed to control increases in absorption to prevent an excessive
appreciation of the RER and to contain inflation and external deficit.
Nevertheless, there are some limitations in the use of fiscal tightening as a
response to capital inflows.


As fiscal measures usually require legislative approval, they are
often executed with a lag; they may also be a difficult political
task;



A tight fiscal policy is somewhat unwieldy for short-term demand
management because of the lags associated with the formulation
and implementation of specific measures.

Where the capital inflows are driven by short-term considerations, the fiscal
response may take the form of taxes on short-term borrowing abroad or tighter
fiscal stance in the face of persistent capital inflows. This is necessary against the
backdrop of unbalanced macroeconomic policies (most often an excessively
expansionary fiscal policy compensated for by a tight monetary policy). Taxes on
short-term borrowing are effective in the short term. But the private sector may be
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quick in finding ways to dodge the taxes through over-and under-invoicing of
imports and exports, and through increased reliance on parallel financial and
foreign exchange markets.
And prolonged taxes on inflows to the banking system could weaken bank profits
and encourage disintermediation. Overall, a tight fiscal policy stance may not
stop the capital inflow. But it may lower aggregate demand and curb the
inflationary impact of capital inflows. In this respect, lower government
expenditure may be more effective than higher taxes.

III.2

Macroeconomic Policy: Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy

Under conditions of surges in short-term capital inflows monetary policy can be
relaxed or tightened. Relaxing monetary policy stance can narrow the
differentials between domestic and foreign interest rates, and hence reduce the
incentives for the inflows. This may be good policy where there are no inflation
expectations. But reducing the monetary policy rate would contribute to
stimulating aggregate demand, which could generate pressures on inflation and
RER appreciation. On the other hand, tightening monetary policy to address an
inflation problem could attract further capital inflows through increase in
domestic interest rates. In this circumstance, the monetary authorities would face
a difficult of trade-off and may require the support of fiscal consolidation
measures – to relieve upward pressures on interest rates and prices.
Generally, the monetary policy instrument of sterilisation (sterilised intervention)
could be used in the early stages of the capital inflow. Sterilised intervention
involves accumulating reserves and sterilising the monetary effects on money
supply. The idea is to insulate the money stock from fluctuations stemming from
the free inflow of capital. Usually, through sterilised intervention, the country‟s
central bank buys foreign exchange (often issuing securities at high interest rates)
to pay for it, and thus, adding to its reserves (often at lower interest rates). Thus,
sterilisation entails fiscal costs, which may be large, resulting in a large quasi-fiscal
deficit (the difference between the interest earned on the reserves and the costs
of financing the sterilization). Also, the ability to sterilise the effects of capital
inflows on the monetary base may be limited if suitable instruments are not
available to the central bank and the domestic financial markets are not well
developed. Besides, aggressive sterilisation through OMO maintains the pressure
on domestic interest rates, perpetuating the conditions that attracted large
inflows in the first place.
In some countries, as inflows persisted and the costs associated with different
types of sterilization became exorbitant, particularly the fiscal costs, successful
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policies began to rely on exchange rate flexibility to discourage capital inflows,
especially of the portfolio type. Adjusting the exchange rate in a timely manner
may preempt the inflationary impetus of the inflows and floating makes the
money supply and domestic credit exogenous to capital inflows. But floating has
its own disadvantages too.

III.3

Foreign Reserve Accumulation

The most common motivation for accumulating large reserves in emerging
economies is to self-insure against external shocks such as abrupt reversals in
capital flows, especially flows driven by short-term factors. A sudden burst of
capital outflows can be painlessly met by a corresponding loss of reserves without
affecting credit meant for the private sector. Besides being a buffer to absorb
adverse external shocks, foreign reserves are also perceived to be a tool to
reduce the probability of self-fulfilling speculative attacks. A country with large
foreign reserves is less likely to suffer from such attacks. Thus, foreign reserves
allows a country a larger margin of manoeuvre to cope with various attacks and
hence help to mitigate their impact on the economy.
But there are costs associated with accumulating foreign reserves.
o Reserves accumulated through purchases of foreign currency via
open market operations entails a fiscal cost as noted above.
o

The resources used to finance foreign reserve accumulation could
alternatively be used to finance either public or private investment
projects. This implies a high opportunity cost of foreign reserve
accumulation.

Overall, the potential benefits of foreign reserve accumulation need to be
compared with the costs when considering increasing the level of foreign
reserves.

III.4

Macro-prudential Regulation and Supervision

The financial consequences of short-term capital inflows can be addressed with
some prudential macro-prudential tools (Sidaoui, Ramos-Francia and Cuadra,
n.d). These include:
o

Reserve requirements or credit ceilings. These can be used to
prevent unsustainable credit expansions;

o

Limits on currency mismatches and improved credit information.
Aimed at improving the quality of loans;
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Capital requirements. Can be used to enhance the financial
system‟s resilience to adverse shocks.

A technical problem that may arise though relates to the possible difficulty in
calibrating the appropriate policy response when using some of these tools (ibid).
Generally, adequate regulation and supervision could be useful in preventing an
inefficient intermediation of capital inflows and thus help to contain systemic risk
in the domestic financial sector.

III.5

Capital Controls

Capital controls can be considered in the context of trade and exchange policy.
They have also been regarded as a macro-prudential tool which some emerging
economies have been adopting in order to cope with massive and speculative
short-term capital inflows. Capital controls are necessary if other policy
instruments have limited effectiveness and if an economy is receiving a greater
volume of capital inflows than it has the capacity to absorb, such that the inflows
will pose problems for economic policy management, particularly, monetary and
exchange rate policies (Obadan, 2004: 101). Although there are credible and
coherent arguments for the imposition of some capital controls, they are an
instrument that can be considered relevant in the context of the “theory of the
second best”.
Generally, capital controls can be imposed either by limiting asset transactions
through market-based mechanisms, such as taxes, or through administrative
measures such as explicit quantitative limits or outright prohibitions. Capital
controls give a country some respite and can be directed at deterring short-term,
overly speculative inflows, as well as moderate the volume of aggregate inflows
and lengthen their maturities.
From the successful experiences of countries like Chile, Columbia and Malaysia,
capital controls could take the form of a prescription that capital inflows remain
in the country for a minimum of, say, one year or that fixed fraction be made in
the form of a non-interest-bearing deposit. For a number of years, the countries
successfully applied such requirements to limit portfolio capital flows, thereby
obtaining a balance between short-term investment and foreign direct
investment that has reduced the volatility of aggregate capital inflow. In other
words, some of the requirements created an incentive for foreign investment to
be long-term by raising the cost of short-term investments. Short-term investments
were limited by making them unprofitable.
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However, there are problems associated with capital controls: One relates to their
enforcement. Capital controls can be evaded if transactions are misreported by
economic agents as capital inflows of the type that are either not subject to
controls or are subject to lower tax rates. In light of the problems, capital controls
tend to lose their effectiveness over time because economic agents will always
find a way to evade them. Also, the imposition of capital controls may raise
uncertainty about future policy actions, which may also negatively affect foreign
agents‟ willingness to invest in the country.
Overall, in view of the inherent costs of capital controls, including possible
misallocation of resources and a lower rate of investment and growth, such
controls should be progressively dismantled as the quality of surveillance and
prudential supervision improves and the capacity of the banking system to
handle flows increases.

IV.

Policy Direction For Nigeria

In discussing this, cognizance is taken of the nature and composition of Nigeria‟s
capital flows, the degrees of volatility of the different components, the
government‟s extant policies on capital flows, and international lessons of
experience. First, on a broad level, let us note the economic policy implications of
the empirical findings on volatility of capital flows for the poor countries, including
Nigeria as follows:
o

Need for policy to encourage and attract long-term capital flows,
FDI in particular;

o

Avoidance of financing of current account deficits with very large
capital inflows of whatever ranking;

o

Considering the high volatility of short-term capital flows (notably,
bank loans and portfolio flows), need to avoid giving too much
exposure to foreigners in the economy in such areas of investment.
Large foreign holdings of short-term treasury bills and similar
financial instruments create potential vulnerability for government,
especially the balance of payments. A major contributor to the
Mexican financial crisis of 1994 – 1995 was the government‟s
accumulation of huge foreign short-term debt in the form of
treasury bills.

Secondly, the following facts should guide the policy on capital flows. From Table
1, it is clear that FDI was relatively much more significant than portfolio investment
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flows over the period, 2005 - 2011. The average FDI inflow was nearly three times
the portfolio investment inflow, while the average net FDI inflow was over ten
times the net portfolio inflow. Other investments, comprising bank loans, currency
and deposits recorded negative net average flow. Portfolio investment and other
investment flows are characterised by much higher volatility than FDI.
As Table 2 further shows that portfolio investment inflow showed great volatility
during the recent global financial crisis. Portfolio inflow declined from US$2,825.59
million in 2006 to US$1,334.3 million in 2008 and to only US$481.69 million in 2009.

Table 2: Trend of Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment Inflows, 2005 –
2011.

2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011

Direct Investment
(US$‟ Million)

Percent
Change (%)

4,978.26
4,897.81
6,086.73
8,248.64
8,649.53
6,098.96
8,914.89

-1.6
24.3
35.5
4.9
-29.5
46.2

Portfolio
Investment (US$‟
Million)
883.0
2,825.59
2,665.50
1,334.30
481.69
3,747.90
5,192.80

Percent
Change
(%)
220.0
-5.7
-49.9
-63.9
678.1
38.6

Source: CBN. Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 22, December, 2011.

But it appears that in the last two years, portfolio investment inflow has
rebounded to acquire greater significance than FDI. Table 3 shows details of
foreign private capital inflows in the first five months of 2012 and 2013. In the two
sub-periods, portfolio investment inflow accounted for over 80 percent of the
total private capital inflow. And equity securities accounted for over 70.0 percent
of the total portfolio inflows.
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Table 3: Structure of Nigeria’s Foreign Private Capital Inflow – January to
May 2012 and January to May 2013.

1. Foreign Direct Investment –
Equity
2. Foreign Direct Investment –
Other Capital
Sub – Total FDI
3. Portfolio Investment - Equity
4. Portfolio Investment – Bonds
5. Portfolio Investment – Money
Market Instruments
Sub – Total – FPI
6. Other Investments – Trade
Credits
7. Other Investments – Loans
8. Other Investments – Currency
Deposits
9. Other Investments – Other
Claims
Sub
–
Total
–
Other
Investments
10. Total Foreign Capital Inflow


January to May
2012 (US $)
648,060,187.93

%

%

10.55
0.38

January to May
2013 (US $)
811,761,557.67
20,142,280.62

23,431,046.51
671,491,234.44

10.93

831,903,838.3

8.31

4,422,071,507.8
206,218,148.9

72.01
3.36

7,096,501,682.9
749,127,420.9

70.93
7.49

423,414,626.4
5,051,704,283.0

6.89
82.3

565,370,843.7
8,410,999,947.5

5.65
84.07

43,671,903.7
366,906,708.0
0.0
7,194,265.0
417,772,876.7

0.71
5.97
0.0
0.12
6.80

0
754,616,466.3
1,733,975.0
5,611,651.53
761,962,092.82

0
7.54
0.02
0.06
7.62

6,140,968,394.1

100

10,004,865,878.6

100.00

8.11
0.20

Source: Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Website: www.nipc.gov.ng/

Very importantly, for some time now, especially since the current democratic
dispensation began in 1999, public policy has favoured the attraction of high
level foreign direct investment and it has been promoted rather aggressively. The
Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) – established by the NIPC Act,
No. 16 of 1995 – promotes, coordinates and monitors domestic and foreign
investment in Nigeria. Various measures have consequently been designed to
promote FDI inflow. Also, in the bid to attract FDI, the government, a few years
ago, set up the Honorary International Investors‟ Council, consisting of world
business and social leaders, to help promote FDI inflow. This Council is chaired by
Baroness Lynda Chalker of Great Britain who was a former member of the British
Parliament and Minister of State for Overseas Development and Africa.
Against the above background, the concern is not much about the volatility of
FDI flows. Rather, it is how to improve the macroeconomic and institutional
environment to attract a higher level of FDI inflow.
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Required therefore for FDI are the following:
o Sound macroeconomic policies, reflecting low inflation, low fiscal
deficits, stable exchange rate, high and sustainable economic
growth, among others. In other words, prudent fiscal and monetary
policies aimed at maintaining macroeconomic stability and investors‟
confidence are indispensable;
o

Strengthening of the financial markets – money and capital markets –
to inspire the confidence of investors;

o

Significant improvement in the investment climate, particularly issues
relating to poor infrastructure, corruption, insecurity of lives and
property, multiple taxes, among others; and

o

Improvements in macroeconomic policies also need to be
complemented with structural reforms to make the economy
competitive. Good economic fundamentals and a more competitive
economy would provide a good basis for the country to handle
upsurges in capital inflows.

For the highly volatile flows such as portfolio investment, and other investment
(bank loans, and currency and deposits), a combination of the following is
suggestive:
o

Good macroeconomic policies, reflecting low fiscal deficit, low
inflation, etc, can also reduce their volatility. Lower levels of inflation
and fiscal deficit may result in lower levels of uncertainty in terms of
the net flows of capital, equity securities in particular; and

o

More effort at developing and improving confidence in the financial
system can reduce the volatility of portfolio and banking flows. Policies
should aim at reinforcing the depth and soundness of the domestic
financial system.

Should portfolio flows become sizable and pose a threat to economic and
financial stability, the following policies can be considered:
o

Monetary policy – sterilisation of inflows. But the fiscal costs of this
would need to be weighed against the benefits;
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o

Prudential capital controls, for example, those that can change the
duration and structure of inflows to relatively long-term;

o

Greater flexibility of the exchange rate; and

o

More reserve accumulation in the context of managing capital flows
in contrast to reserve accumulation arising from crude oil export
earnings.
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